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ABSTRACT
There is ample empirical evidence that investments in (public) companies are
correlated with cash flow. This may either be explained as evidence of financing constraints
(Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen, 1988), as excessive conservatism by managers, restraining
investments to the internally generated cash flow (Kaplan and Zingales, 2000). We test the
investment-cash flow sensitivity in unquoted Belgian companies with a modified sales
accelerator model, using unbalanced panel data and GMM techniques. We show that
investments in tangible fixed assets are positively related to cash flow. Contrary to our
expectations, this sensitivity is not reduced, but it increases, when companies receive venture
capital. We interpret the results as evidence of the presence of financing constraints and
underinvestment problems in unquoted companies. Venture capital intermediaries are not able
to eliminate financing constraints in Belgian unquoted companies.
4INTRODUCTION
In a perfect financial market, funds are always available for positive net present value
investment projects and firm value is independent of its financial structure. Investment and
financing decisions can then be separated (Modigliani and Miller, 1958) : there is always
enough financing available for value-creating investment projects. Financial markets,
however, are not perfect. In the presence of market imperfections, investors may ration capital
and positive net present value projects may be denied financing, or only be able to obtain
certain types of funding (Fluck, Holtz-Eaking and Rosen, 1998). This makes financing and
investment decisions interdependent in the real world, and especially in entrepreneurial
companies.
Fazarri, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) have initiated a substantial empirical literature
showing a positive relationship between internally generated cash flow and capital spending
(fixed plant and equipment) in quoted companies. Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) showed a
comparable sensitivity of investments in research and development (R&D) to internal cash
flow.  There are several explanations for this sensitivity. First, firms may face a financing
constraint due to information asymmetries, making that firms are unable to attract equity
(Myers and Majluf, 1984) or debt (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) from outside parties to finance
positive net present value projects. This has as a consequence that investments are restricted
to the amount of internally generated cash flow. This is referred to as the underinvestment
problem. Alternatively, the positive relation may be a consequence of investing excess cash in
negative net present value projects rather than distributing it to the shareholders (Jensen,
1986), leading to an overinvestment problem. In a sample of large, quoted companies, Kaplan
and Zingales (1997) show however that less constrained firms exhibit a higher sensitivity of
investments to cash flow. They argue therefore that the positive relationship between cash
flow and investments may be caused by excessive conservatism of managers (Kaplan and
Zingales, 2000), or by non-optimizing behavior (Hines and Thaler, 1995).
Although there is a large body of empirical literature documenting the relationship
between investments and cash flow in large, quoted companies, little is known about this
relationship in young, unquoted companies. This relationship is interesting as young
companies face high information asymmetries and therefore financing constraints are likely to
be important (Gompers, 1995). The purpose of this paper is to empirically investigate the
5relationship between capital spending and internally generated cash flow in young, unquoted
companies, and more specifically the role that venture capital intermediaries may play in this
relationship. A sample of Belgian companies is used to test the relationship. First, an
overview of the relevant literature is given and hypotheses are derived. Thereafter, the
sample, the variables, and the method of analysis are described; the fourth section reports the
results. Finally, conclusions and further research questions are proposed.
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
In the absence of capital market frictions, internal and external finance can be viewed
as perfect substitutes. However, when managers possess private information about the
investment opportunities of the firm this is no longer valid. Myers and Majluf (1984) argue
that if outside suppliers of capital are not fully informed about the value of the firm’s assets
and investment opportunities, then the market may undervalue the firm’s equity. Firms then
prefer internal funds to external funds because the former are less costly. However, when
internal funds are exhausted, firms that face finance constraints may reject positive net present
value projects. This is referred to as the underinvestment problem, leading to a positive
relationship between cash flow and investments: internally generated cash flow becomes an
important determinant of investment spending (Vogt, 1994). We refer to Hubbard (1998) for
an extensive overview of the empirical literature on the cash flow sensitivity of investments.
There is a second explanation for the positive relation between internally generated
cash and investment spending, namely the free cash flow hypothesis (Jensen, 1986). Here the
focus is on agency problems caused by the separation of ownership and control and the
incentives that managers have to undertake actions that are not in the interest of the
shareholders. Jensen (1986) argues that managers may pursue other goals than value
maximization. In order to achieve their objectives, managers will spend internal funds on
investment projects, even if these do not create value. Thus, the free cash flow that is at the
discretion of the managers after profitable projects are undertaken may be invested in projects
that increase firm size but destroy value. This is referred to as the overinvestment problem.
There is evidence that reliance upon external funds (e.g. provided by capital markets or bank
credit) may involve discipline and monitoring by the external financial party and thereby
reduce overinvestment. For example, Goergen and Renneboog (2001) have shown that
ownership structure does influence the cash flow/investment relationship. When industrial
6companies or families control large shareholdings, there is evidence of increased
overinvestment. In contrast, large institutional holdings reduce suboptimal investing.
Kaplan and Zingales (2000) explain the positive relationship between cash flow and
investments in a different way. They have shown that the positive relationship between cash
flow and investments is stronger in firms that are not likely to be confronted with cash
constraints (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997). Possible explanations for their findings are excessive
conservatism by managers, restraining investments to the internally generated cash flow
(Kaplan and Zingales, 2000) or by non-optimizing behavior by managers (Hines and Thaler,
1995). Yet, a shortcoming of Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000) is that they assume that all
companies are able to raise enough financing, but that the cost of external funding is higher
for financially constrained companies due to their intrinsic characteristics. However, financial
constrains may be more severe : information asymmetries may cause a firm to be denied
outside (debt or equity) financing, even if the firm has positive net present value projects.
Either a firm can attract outside financing, and then the relationship between cash flow and
investment will be weaker, or it cannot, and then there will be a strong sensitivity of the level
of investments to internally generated cash flows. In firms that face large information
asymmetries, a positive relation between internally generated cash flow and investment is
therefore likely to be evidence of cash constraints.
Venture capital (VC) companies, as financial intermediaries in private equity markets,
help to close the funding gap by reducing information asymmetries. Amit et al. (1998) argue
that one of the primary reasons for the existence of VC companies is their information
processing capacities which may reduce information asymmetries, and hence adverse
selection and moral hazard problems. The role of VCs is essentially to screen, contract, and
monitor investments (Berger and Udell, 1998 ; Manigart and Sapienza, 1999) in order to
minimize the costs of delegating decisions to entrepreneurs (agency and moral hazard costs)
or to induce them to reveal critical information on their activities (reducing information
asymmetries). Haubrick (1990), Rajan (1992), Admati and Pfleiderer (1994) and Reid (1996)
stress the role of VC companies as inside investors in gaining private information on
investment projects during both pre-investment screening and post-investment monitoring,
thereby reducing information asymmetries between entrepreneurs and investors. This allows
VC companies to invest profitably in projects that uninformed outsiders reject and hence to
reduce the underinvestment problem. Investments of VC backed companies are thus likely to
7be less constrained by internal cash flow generation than those of comparable non-VC backed
companies.
Postinvestment monitoring by VC companies, e.g. through a seat on the board of
directors, also reduces overinvestment problems of cash rich companies, because it prevents
managers from undertaking actions that are not in the interest of the company. For example,
Sapienza, et al. (1996) found evidence that venture capitalists’ monitoring increases in
response to agency risks. Monitoring leads to better information availability for venture
capitalists, early problem detection and effective decision making in VC backed companies
(Mitchell et al., 1997). Well-performed monitoring by venture capitalists should reduce the
divergence of interests between managers and outside investors, and should thus reduce the
overinvestment problem (Goergen and Renneboog, 2001). Therefore, VC backed companies
which generate excess cash are less likely to invest in negative NPV projects than non-VC
backed companies, as the former are closely monitored by the VCs during the whole
investment process. Companies, backed by VC firms, are therefore less likely to have
problems with under- and overinvestment.  Foregoing leads to following hypothesis :
Hypothesis 1: The positive relation between internally generated cash flows and
investments is attenuated when a VC firm invests in a company. On the one hand,
liquidity constraints are relaxed thanks to reduced information asymmetries, and on
the other hand the free cash flow problem is attenuated thanks to increased monitoring
by outside shareholders.
The reduced sensitivity of VC backed companies to internally generated cash flow is
likely to be more pronounced for young companies than for more mature companies.
Information asymmetries and therefore finance constraints are especially important in the
early life of a company (Amit et al., 1998). Yet, young and high growth companies often
develop products and ideas that require substantial capital, exceeding the internally generated
cash flows or entrepreneurs’ own funds, especially in the formative stage of their firm’s life
cycle (Gompers, 1995). Companies with large information asymmetries, that lack tangible
assets that might serve as collateral for bank debt and that are associated with significant ex
ante uncertainty about their cash flows, are moreover unlikely to receive significant bank
loans (Maier and Walker, 1987 ; Gompers, 1995 ; Admati and Pfleiderer, 1994). Younger
companies are therefore more likely to be cash constrained than older companies. The
8information processing capacities of VC firms should enable VC backed companies to reduce
the large information asymmetries. This leads to following hypothesis :
Hypothesis 2: The positive relation between internally generated cash flows and
investments is more attenuated in young VC backed companies than in mature VC
backed companies.
METHOD OF ANALYSIS
Sample and research design
Foregoing hypotheses will be tested on a sample of unquoted Belgian VC backed
companies and comparable (matched) non-VC backed companies. In contrast with the U.S.
where most studies on the relation between cash flow and investments have been done,
Belgium has a Continental European financial system. Only a minority of Belgian firms are
quoted on a stock exchange, while the most important source of external financing is debt,
and more specifically bank loans. The venture capital industry, however, is quite well
developed in Belgium.  The first player on the market, namely GIMV, was established and
financially backed by the Flemish government in 1980 ; the first private VC firms emerged in
the mid-eighties (Ooghe et al., 1991).  Since then, the Belgian VC market has grown at a
steady rate, while it has shown an exponential growth in 1998-1999, as in most European
countries, followed by a slowdown in 2000 (statistics of the European Venture Capital
Association, EVCA).  Investments by Belgian private equity companies equalled 0.288% of
GDP in 1999 and 0.231% of GDP in 2000, while this was 0.383% in Europe on average.
However, Belgian VC companies are quite active in early stage and in high tech investments
compared to their European colleagues.  For example, 58.7% (in 1999) and 70.8% (in 2000)
of all private equity investments in Belgium went to high tech companies, compared to
European averages of 25.6% in 1999 and 31.4% in 2000.  Of all funds raised in 2000 by
Belgian private equity firms, 97.9% is allocated to early stage and expansion investments.
This compares to a mere 46.1% in Europe as a whole, where (management) buy-out,
replacement capital and other later stage transactions are more prevalent (EVCA, 2001).
A sample of VC backed companies is constructed using secondary sources.  Yearly
accounts of VC firms, press clippings, press releases and websites are used to identify Belgian
9companies that received VC between 1987 and 1997.  The total sample is composed of 859
companies, representing 56% of the total number of investments in Belgium from 1987 to
1997 (EVCA statistics). After excluding companies in the financial sector and holding
companies, and companies for which the yearly accounts are not found in the files of the
National Bank of Belgium, 565 companies remain (see also Manigart, Baeyens and Van
Hyfte, 2002).
Following Megginson and Weiss (1991) and Lerner (1999), each VC backed company
is matched with a non VC backed company on following criteria, measured in the year before
the VC funding (or the year of VC funding, for the companies that received VC from their
inception) : activity (NACE-code), size (with total assets as proxy), and stage. The pre-
investment situation of the VC backed companies is used, so as not to introduce a size bias
caused by the funding itself. For matching purposes, a start-up company is defined as a
company at most 2 years old at the time of funding, an early stage company is between 3 and
5 years old at the time of funding and a mature company is older than 5 years at the time of
funding.
The main data for the study are the yearly accounts of the companies, from the year of
the investment up to at most 5 years after the initial investment or up to 1999.  This yields an
unbalanced panel with 4991 company-year data. For each company-year, more than 50
variables from the financial accounts (balance sheet, profit and loss statement, and additional
information) are recorded. Moreover, for each company, it is known whether it still exists as
an independent entity, whether and when it has gone bankrupt, been involved in a merger or
acquisition, been closed or split. This set-up allows us to include surviving (successful) and
failing (unsuccessful) companies, in contrast to most studies of this type.1 Including both
surviving and non-surviving companies eliminates a positive survivor bias and increases the
validity of the results.
                                                          
1 Manigart, Baeyens and Van Hyfte (2002) have shown that 44% of Belgian VC backed companies do not exist
as an independent entity 9 years after the investment, due to bankruptcy, closure, acquisition or other causes.
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The model
Goergen and Renneboog (2001) distinguish four classes of empirically testable models of the
investment/cash flow sensitivity.  In the neoclassical models, the relative cost of capital is the
main determinant of corporate investment :
Investment level = f (Capital cost, cash flow, other variables)
A widely used model is the sales accelerator model (Deloof, 1998; Mairesse et al.,
1999), where it is assumed that investment grows along with total sales as a measure of the
output of a company:
Investment level = f (Sales, cash flow, other variables)
In foregoing models, a positive relation between investment and cash flow is assumed
to be evidence of liquidity constraints.  However, these models do not include forward-
looking variables: they do not incorporate expectations about the future profitability of
investments (Mairesse et al., 1999).  Models incorporating Tobin’s Q take the future into
account, as the expectation of future profitability is captured by the forward-looking stock
market valuation :
Investment level = f(Tobin’s Q, cash flow, other variables)
Finally, Euler-equation models (Bond and Meghir, 1994 a, b) assume that the level of
investment is a function of discounted expected future investment adjusted for the impact of
the expected changes in the input prices and net marginal output :
Investment levelt = f(Investment levelt-1, cash flow, sales, other variables)
We use a modified accelerator model (Mairesse et al., 1999) to test the relationship
between investments in tangible fixed assets and cash flows. In this traditional model, it is
assumed that, in the long run, investments grow along with total output of the firm as
measured by sales and the capital cost:
log(Kit) = αt + β*log(sales) - σ* log(capital cost)
with:
Kit: capital stock for firm i at time t
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Taking the first difference and assuming ∆ log (Kit) ≈ Iit/Ki,t-1 - δ leads to:
Iit/Ki,t-1 = δ + β*∆log (sales) - σ*log(capital cost)
The cost of capital, difficult to measure, is in general proxied by time dummies and
firms’ specific effects (Cincera, 2002). Following Fazzari et al. (1998), foregoing model is
augmented by cash flow effects as an indication of internal finance, in order to test the
presence of financial constraints.
Investments are estimated as a function of sales (and lagged sales) and cash flow (and
lagged cash flow). As a large number of companies in our database do not report sales, value
added is used as a proxy of output, rather than sales (Cincera, 2002; Van Cayseele, 2002).
Given the increased importance of outsourcing non-core activities and refocusing on core
competences, value added may well be a better proxy of firm output than sales. Investments,
value added and cash flow are scaled by  beginning-of-year net fixed assets (or capital stock)
(Mairesse et al., 1999). The model used here is then:
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=itI  investment of firm i in period t in tangible fixed assets
=
−1,tiK beginning-of-year net fixed assets
=itGM value added of firm i during period t
=itCF  cash flow of firm i in period t
We control for future firm-specific investment opportunities by not only includding
lagged value added, but also adding past investments in intangible assets to the model  It can
be argued that past investments in research and development (Van Cayseele, 2002; Titman
and Wessels, 1988; Cincera, 2002) indicate the growth potential and future profitability of
companies. As a large number of companies in our database do not report investments in
research and development, past investments in intangible assets is used as a proxy of future
investment opportunities, leading to following model :
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The effect of receiving VC funding on the relationship between cash flow and
investment is measured by including (VC * CFit)/Ki,t-1, where VC is a dummy that takes value
1 if a company is VC backed or 0 else. Our central hypothesis is supported if the coefficient
of the cross term is negative.
As a check of the robustness of the findings, the hypotheses are tested in another way.
The sample is split in two subsamples, one consisting of all VC backed companies and the
second one consisting of all non-VC backed companies. The model is then estimated in each
subsample separately. The hypothesis is supported if the cash flow coefficient is significantly
positive in the subsample of non-VC backed companies and not significant or significantly
smaller in the subsample of VC backed companies.
Foregoing models are tested on the total sample and on the sample of young and of
mature companies separately, in order to test hypothesis 2. For this purpose, young companies
are defined as start-up and early stage companies, i.e. companies that are at most five years
old at the time of VC funding. Mature companies are later stage companies that are more than
five years old at the time of VC funding.
Method of analysis
Data have been analysed with unbalanced panel data techniques and with GMM.
Unbalanced panel data techniques are used, because not all companies remain in the database
for five years.2  The econometric model is the usual linear regression model with firm effects
and year effects:
yit = xitβ + αi + δt + εit = xitβ + ηit
with i = 1,...,N (N = number of companies)
           t = 1, ..., T (T = number of years)
                                                          
2 We have tested the investment model up to 3 years after venture capital investment, up to 4 years after venture
capital investment and up to 5 years after venture capital investment.  The results are consistent across the time
frame considered.  We report the models up to 5 years after venture capital investment.
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          yit = dependent variable (investments in tangible fixed assets/beginning-of-year tangible
and intangible fixed assets)
          xit = the vector of the explanatory variables (including lagged yit)
         αi = firm-specific effects
         δi = time-specific effects
         εi = disturbance term
The overall disturbance term ηit in this model consists of firm effects, αi, time effects,
δi, and idiosyncratic pure disturbances. This overall disturbance  term accounts for a variety of
specification errors. Because the number of years, T, is small (in our case, between 2 to 5) and
the number of firms, N, is reasonably large (between 124 and 598), the time-specific effects
are estimated simply by including a full set of time dummies in all models. We focus rather
on the treatment of the "permanent" differences across firms, the αi.  Potential correlations
between the explanatory variables, xit’s, and the frim-specific effects, αi's can lead to potential
biases in the parameters β. These biases can be corrected by using the within firm
transformation or by first differencing, which removes firm-specific effects.
As Mairesse et al. (1999) indicate, the within or first differenced estimates of
traditional panel data analyses can still be biased due to: (1) random measurement errors in
the explanatory variables xit , (2) simultaneity between the contemporaneous xit and the
contemporaneous disturbance εit, (3) endogeneity of the contemporaneous xit with respect to
the past disturbances. The use of instrumental variables can correct these three potential
biases. An instrument is a variable that can be assumed to be uncorrelated with the models
error, but correlated with the variable itself (Verbeek, 2000). More specifically, we apply the
generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991).
Here firm-specific effects are first removed by forming first differences. In such a model,
endogenous variables lagged two or more periods will be valid instruments provided there is
no serial correlation in the time-varying component of the error terms in equation. We test for
serial correlation in the first difference residuals to make sure that this condition is met. We
also test for instrument validity using a Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions. We refer
to Mairesse et al. (1999) for a fuller account of the GMM techniques.
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In this study, we first analyse the investment – cash flow relation using panel data
techniques. Thereafter GMM techniques are used. Because the variables in the GMM
analyses are first differenced variables and therefore more lags of the variables are needed, the
sample that can be used to perform GMM is smaller than that of the panel data analyses. In
order to be sure that potential differences in the results of the panel data and the GMM
analyses are due to the technique that is used – and not because of a different sample of
observations - the results of panel data analyses on the smaller GMM sample are also reported
in Appendix. GMM analyses are conducted on the total and mature sample only. GMM
analyses are not appropriate to study the sample of young companies because too much lags –
which are not available for young companies - are needed.
Table 1, panels A and B,  shows how the final samples for panel data and GMM are
constructed. First,  company-year data with negative cash flows or negative investments are
removed from the unbalanced panel of 4991 observations. Especially young companies often
have negative cash flows and/or negative investments. For example, as much as 83% (515 of
618 companies) of the young companies in our sample have negative cash flows in at least
one year, compared to 42% of the mature companies. In the sample of young companies 77 %
(479 of 618 companies) of the firms has diinvested in at least one year, compared to 31 % of
the mature companies have . Company-year data with missing values are also removed. Due
to missing values of at least one of the variables in the analyses, almost 40% of the young
companies’ observations are lost for panel data analyses. From the remaining observations,
company-year data with outliers are filtered using a 0.5 % top and bottom percentile.3 Finally,
companies that have an insufficient number of company-year data are removed from the
sample. Whereas panel data analyses require at least 2 observations per company, for GMM
analyses at least 3 observations are needed. The final sample for the panel data analyses
consists of 598 companies of which 261 are young companies and 337 are mature companies.
For the GMM analyses only two third or 402 companies remain. Slightly more VC backed
than non VC backed companies are lost.
The variables
The computation of the variables is given in appendix 1. Table 2 reports the basic
statistics of the dependent and independent variables (in the sample used for panel data
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analyses).4 Despite careful matching, the absolute amounts of investments in tangible assets
by VC backed companies are significantly larger, compared to those of their non VC backed
counterparts. Also value added and cash flows are larger for VC backed firms. When scaling
these variables to beginning of year fixed assets, we see that there is no significant difference
in investments in tangible assets between VC companies and non-VC backed counterparts
(panel A). This is counterintuitive : common wisdom goes that VC backed companies have
more investment opportunities and thus have a higher investment rate.  Therefore, we have
taken a closer look at the investment behaviour of the companies in the sample.  Appendix 2
gives the amount invested in tangible assets for every year after VC funding.5  Not
surprisingly, VC backed companies invest more in the year they receive VC funding (year 0).
Investments of VC backed companies (median value : 39.9 % of beginning of year fixed
assets, K) are significantly higher than those of non-VC backed companies (median value:
26.7 % of K). In later years, however, there is no significant difference between the
investment behaviour of VC backed and non-VC backed companies, although both the
median and mean investment of VC backed companies is lower in all the years following the
funding.6  It seems that receiving VC has only a short-term effect on investment behavior,
with significantly higher investments in the year of VC funding and (not significantly) lower
investments thereafter.
Looking at the investment behavior of young and mature companies separately yields
the same conclusions (table 2 and appendix 2, panels B and C). Especially young VC backed
companies invest more during the year of VC funding. Whereas the median investment of
non-VC backed companies is 27% of K, the median investment of young VC backed
companies in the year of funding is more than twice this ratio (56% of K) and that of mature
VC backed companies is 34% of K. Moreover, the mean investment of young VC backed
companies in the year of funding is as large as 151% of K, which is more than three times the
mean investment of young non-VC backed companies (49% of K). After the year of
                                                                                                                                                                                    
3 We also used other filters for outliers. They did not have an impact on our main conclusions.
4 The basic statistics of the dependent and independent variables in the smaller sample used for the GMM
analyses is given in appendix 3. The main conclusions with respect to the variables are the same for both
samples.
5 The basic statistics of investments in tangible assets by year after VC participation in the smaller sample used
for GMM analyses is given in appendix 4. The main conclusions with respect to the variables are the same for
both samples.
6 VC backed companies invest significantly less than non-VC backed companies in the fourth year after they
receive VC funding.
16
participation non-VC backed companies tend to invest slightly larger amounts, however not
significantly so.
Table 2, panel A, further shows that the (lagged) investments in intangible assets are
significantly larger for VC backed companies, compared to non-VC backed companies.
Whereas non-VC backed companies invest on average 2% of K in intangible assets, VC
backed companies invest on average up to 5% of K in intangibles. This indicates that VC
backed companies may have larger growth opportunities than VC backed companies,
although this is not followed by more investments in tangible assets (cfr. supra). The growth
in value added (∆ log VA) is significantly higher for VC backed companies than for non-VC
backed companies: VC backed companies have a growth in the log of value added of 8.8%
(median value), compared to 4.6% for non-VC backed companies.  Yet, the value added (not
shown in the table) and the cash flow are significantly higher for non-VC backed companies.
Non-VC backed companies have a median value added of 2.1 times K, compared to a median
value added of 1.6 times K for VC backed companies. Whereas for non-VC backed
companies the median cash flow is 47% of K, cash flows of VC backed companies are 40%
of K.  The same conclusions hold for the subsamples of mature companies on the one hand
and of young companies on the other hand.
We may conclude that, while investments in tangible assets by VC backed firms are
not significantly different from those of non-VC backed (except for the year of VC funding),
investments in intangible assets are significantly larger for VC backed companies. Value
added and cash flows, on the contrary are significantly larger for non-VC backed companies.
Yet, VC backed companies have a significantly higher growth of their value added, consistent
with the finding that they may have higher growth opportunities thanks to their higher
investments in intangibles.  However, growth opportunities in value added are not followed
by growth in tangible assets.  It seems that companies use VC to increase current expenses
(e.g. expenses for prototyping, establishing market presence, distribution channels, …) to
build their company, as evidenced by their smaller value added and cash flows, rather than
for investments in fixed assets.
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ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
Table 3, panels A, B and C give the panel data estimates of the investments in tangible
fixed assets for the total sample, the sample of young companies and the sample of mature
companies respectively.7  As the Hausman (1978) test statistics indicate that the fixed effects
models are to be used, we do not report the random effects models.
Table 4, panels A and B give the GMM analyses for the total sample and the sample of
mature companies. The consistency of the GMM estimators relies on the assumption that the
error term in levels lacks serial correlation. The error term in the first difference equation
should therefore show MA(1) properties; that is, we expect a first order serial correlation, but
no second order serial correlation. The m(1) and m(2) statistics of Arellano and Bond (1991),
reported in Table 4, indicate a first order serial correlation and reject second order serial
correlation, consistent with conditions for consistent estimators. Another specification test is
the Sargan test for overidentified restrictions. As shown in table 4 this test does not reject the
null hypothesis that the model is correctly specified and that the instruments are uncorrelated
with the residuals for the GMM estimations. We can therefore conclude that there is no
misspecification in our GMM models.
The first half of tables 3 and 4 gives the estimates of the limited model without
investment in intangible assets (as proxy for investment opportunities) as independent
variable, while the estimates of the expanded model, including investment in intangible
assets, is given in the second half of tables 3 and 4.  An examination of the first and second
halves of tables 3 and 4 shows that there are only small, non-significant differences between
the models with and without investment in intangible assets.  The coefficient of the
investment in intangible assets is never significant.  In the remainder of the paper, we will
concentrate on the more elaborate models including investment in intangible assets.
Panel data analyses show that the output accelerator model explains variation in
investments in tangible assets. Indeed, the sum of the coefficients of value added and value
added lagged is significant and positive in all models (table 3). Investments in tangible assets
grow with increasing value added, as well in VC backed companies as in non-VC backed
companies.  In more refined GMM analyses, however, the sum of the value added coefficients
is not significant in most models (table 4) and when it is significant, it is even negative.
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Comparing the results of the panel data analyses in the expanded sample (table3) and in the
reduced GMM sample (appendix  4) shows that the difference in the findings for the
coefficient of the value added is caused by the more limited sample in the GMM analyses,
rather than with the different econometric estimation procedure.  As the investment-output
relationship is not our core interest in this paper, we do not further investigate this difference.
Investments in tangible assets are significantly and positively related to cash flows,
generated in the same and in the previous year, as the sum of the CF coefficients is significant
and positive in all (sub)samples, in all models and estimated with both estimation techniques.
The cash flow coefficients are large compared to those found in other studies ; in the GMM
specification they are close to one.   This may hint that there are large liquidity constraints in
the companies in our sample.  These companies are smaller than in most of the other studies
dealing with the investment-cash flow relationship.  Our results therefore may be interpreted
as evidence of the existence of severe liquidity constraints in small, unquoted companies.
Contrary to hypothesis 1, the sum of the VC*CF coefficients (total sample) is positive and
significant in the panel data estimation (table 3, panel A), but not significant in the GMM
estimation (table 4, panel A). Yet, the sum of the CF coefficients in the sample of VC backed
companies is considerably higher than the sum of the CF coefficients in the sample of non-
VC backed companies in all specifications.  These results indicate that hypothesis 1 is not
supported for unquoted Belgian companies: the positive relation between internally generated
cash flows and investments is not attenuated when VC invest in a company. On the contrary,
despite VC funding investments by VC backed companies appear to be more cash constrained
than their VC backed counterparts. Our results hold also in the model with investments in
intangible assets as proxy for better investment opportunities. Despite the information
processing capacities of venture capitalists and the increased legitimacy they provide to their
portfolio companies, they are not able to eliminate the investment-cash flow sensitivity in
small, unquoted companies.
When the sample is split between young and mature companies (table 3, panels B and
C and table 4, panel B), foregoing results are even stronger.   The positive relation between
investments and past and current cash flow is positive and significant in all specifications
(including GMM for mature companies), and this relation is considerably stronger for VC
                                                                                                                                                                                    
7 Appendix 5 gives the panel data estimates for the smaller sample used for the GMM analyses.
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backed companies compared to non VC backed companies, even after controlling for
investment opportunities. Our results do not support hypothesis 2: venture capital funding
does not decrease the investment–cash flow sensitivity, neither for young (only panel data
estimates)8, nor for mature companies.   The panel data analyses show higher coefficients for
VC * Cash Flow in the samples of young (value of 0.604) companies than in the sample of
mature companies (value of 0.353).  In the split samples, the young VC backed companies
have the highest cash flow coefficient, followed by the mature VC backed companies.
Hypothesis 2 is clearly not supported.  Receiving venture capital does not reduce the
sensitivity of investments in tangible assets to the internally generated cash flow, on the
contrary.  Surprisingly, this sensitivity is smallest for young, non-VC backed companies.9
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
One of the primary reasons for the existence of VC companies is their capacity to
process information, thereby reducing information asymmetries. The role of VC companies
consists basically of pre-investment screening, post-investment monitoring and value-adding
(Manigart and Sapienza, 1999). If they perform these roles well, then VC funding should lead
to the reduction of both under- and overinvestment problems. Pre-investment screening
should allow venture capitalist to invest profitably in projects that would be turned down by
uninformed investors, hence reducing financing constraints and underinvestment problems.
Moreover, post-investment monitoring should reduce overinvestment problems of cash rich
companies. We therefore expect that investments by venture capital backed companies will be
less sensitive to the available amount of internally generated cash flow than investments in
comparable companies that did not receive VC.
We find that, with exception of the year of funding, VC backed companies do not
invest more in tangible assets, but they have lower value added and cash flows than non-VC
backed companies. This may be explained by the fact that VC backed companies increase
their expenses in order to build their company (prototyping, establishing market presence,
distribution channels, …). These are, however, not reported as investments in yearly accounts.
                                                          
8 GMM models cannot be estimated on the sample of young companies (cfr. supra).
9 This conclusion should be interpreted cautiously, as panel data analyses are not the econometrically best
estimation technique for the probem at hand.
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Investments in intangible assets are higher (but still quite small and unimportant) for VC
backed companies. Receiving VC thus leads to higher expenses and higher investments in
intangibles. These types of expenses are difficult to finance wiht debt, given that they yield no
collateral for the debtor. Receiving VC helps a company to finance these needs, for which
attracting ohter sources of financing may prove to be the most difficult.
Yet, we show that the empirically well documented sensitivity of investments in fixed
assets to internally generated cash flow holds in a sample of unquoted Belgian companies.
Contrary to our expectations, however, VC backed companies - both young and mature - are
more cash constrained than their non-VC backed counterparts. This finding holds when
controlling for the availability of firm-specific investment opportunities.  We interpret these
results as evidence of the presence of more severe financial constraints for VC backed
companies than for non-VC backed companies.
Especially young companies are likely to face severe financial constraints for several
reasons. There are no internally generated funds accumulated in the past. Information
asymmetries are high, as there is no history of past performances. Risk is considerably higher
than in existing companies, as it is well documented that bankruptcy rates are considerably
higher for young companies than for older, established companies due to, among other
factors, low legitimacy of new companies and the fact that routines are not yet established.
This makes that external funding – either equity or debt - is often not available for those
companies, implying that the cost of external funding is infinite. Given the likelihood of
financial constraints in a young firm, we interpret the high sensitivity of investments to the
available internal cash flow in young VC backed companies as evidence of the existence of
severe liquidity constraints. It is likely that the unavailability of funding leads to
underinvestment in VC backed companies, as they limit their investments to the level of
internally generated cash flow. Our findings show that funding provided by VC funds is not
able to eliminate financing constraints for investments in fixed assets.  Despite the fact that
VC firms decrease information asymmetries and increase the legitimacy of their portfolio
companies, they are not able to reduce liquidity constraints.  Apparently, receiving VC
funding alone does not provide companies with the necessary financing, eventually from other
sources, to pursue their investment opportunities in fixed assets.  This calls into question the
efficiency of the Belgian VC industry in reducing information asymmetries and play their key
roles of financial intermediaries.  It is an open question whether this finding is specific for the
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Belgian VC industry or applies to the VC industry in other countries as well. Yet, VCs seem
to play a positive role in financing more intangible assets and expenses.
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APPENDIX 1.
VARIABLE DEFINITION
Variable Measure
(Iit / Ki,t-1) tangible Investments in  tangible fixed assets scaled by
beginning-of-year intangible and tangible fixed
assets
[acquisition value + sales and disposals (<0) + revaluation surplusses of acquisitions from third parties
– depreciations and amounts written down (<0) of tangible fixed assets] / [beginning-of-year stock of
intangible and tangible fixed assets]
(Iit / Ki,t-1) intangible Investments in intangible fixed assets scaled by
beginning-of-year intangible and tangible fixed
assets
[acquisition value + sales and disposals (<0) + revaluation surplusses of acquisitions from third parties
– depreciations and amounts written down (<0) of intangible fixed assets] / [beginning-of-year stock
of intangible and tangible fixed assets]
∆log VA First difference of log value added
∆log VAi,t-1 First difference of lag of log value added
CFit / Ki,t-1 Cash flow scaled by beginning-of-year
intangible and tangible fixed assets
[Cash generated (or used), after dividend payout, not taking into account the changes in long term or
short term financing, changes in working capital, investments in fixed assets and the sales of fixed
assets]/ [beginning-of-year stock of intangible and tangible fixed assets]
CFi,t-1 / Ki,t-2 Lag of cash flow scaled by beginning-of-year
intangible and tangible fixed assets
Lagged variable of cash flow scaled by beginning-of-year intangible and tangible fixed assets
VC Venture capital Dummy variable: =1, when firm received VC financing between 1987 and 1997; =0 else
VC*[CFit / Ki,t-1] Cross term of VC and cash flow scaled by
beginning-of-year intangible and tangible fixed
assets
VC multiplied by cash flow scaled by beginning-of-year intangible and tangible fixed assets
VC*[CFi,t-1 / Ki,t-2] Cross term of VC and lag of cash flow scaled
by beginning-of-year intangible and tangible
fixed assets
VC multiplied by lag of cash flow scaled by beginning-of-year intangible and tangible fixed assets
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APPENDIX 2
Basic statistics of investments in tangible assets (Ii,t / Ki,t-1)tang by year after VC participation
Panel A: total sample
VC + non VC VC non VC Sign.Year after VC
participation # observations Median Mean St. Dev. Minimum Maximum Median Mean St. Dev. Median Mean St.Dev.
0 350 0.310 0.665 1.093 0.004   9.391 0.399 0.899 1.432 0.267 0.477 0.659 ***
1 414 0.299 0.537 0.749 0.007   5.997 0.285 0.596 0.944 0.301 0.492 0.556
2 442 0.262 0.532 0.943 0.002 10.220 0.246 0.442 0.691 0.271 0.605 1.103
3 448 0.240 0.480 0.693 0.003   6.131 0.223 0.428 0.639 0.251 0.526 0.736
4 388 0.236 0.463 0.749 0.003   5.328 0.205 0.403 0.656 0.278 0.517 0.823 *
5 304 0.208 0.398 0.601 0.003   4.473 0.249 0.504 0.792 0.187 0.300 0.313
Panel B: mature companies
VC + non VC VC non VC Sign.Year after VC
participation # observations Median Mean St. Dev. Minimum Maximum Median Mean St. Dev. Median Mean St.Dev.
0 276 0.289 0.594 0.844 0.004   5.767 0.342 0.740 0.992 0.260 0.475 0.681 **
1 283 0.296 0.501 0.697 0.007   5.997 0.265 0.589 0.924 0.300 0.432 0.433
2 262 0.274 0.500 0.879 0.008 10.220 0.266 0.401 0.469 0.292 0.583 1.106
3 248 0.246 0.468 0.675 0.003   6.131 0.246 0.435 0.676 0.245 0.497 0.675
4 211 0.239 0.431 0.624 0.003   4.910 0.207 0.450 0.767 0.286 0.414 0.468
5 161 0.254 0.417 0.613 0.006   4.473 0.259 0.510 0.802 0.245 0.332 0.348
Panel C: young companies
VC + non VC VC non VC Sign.Year after VC
participation # observations Median Mean St. Dev. Minimum Maximum Median Mean St. Dev. Median Mean St.Dev.
0   74 0.398 0.931 1.714 0.001 9.391 0.564 1.515 2.419 0.267 0.485 0.579 ***
1 131 0.324 0.613 0.847 0.010 5.649 0.337 0.613 0.999 0.315 0.613 0.734
2 180 0.219 0.578 1.030 0.002 7.511 0.180 0.504 0.931 0.237 0.636 1.103
3 200 0.226 0.494 0.717 0.003 5.292 0.208 0.419 0.595 0.310 0.563 0.808
4 177 0.230 0.501 0.876 0.005 5.328 0.176 0.351 0.503 0.246 0.647 1.109
5 143 0.168 0.376 0.588 0.003 4.177 0.178 0.496 0.786 0.159 0.264 0.266
Significance level of Wilcoxon rank sum test (two tailed): * 0.050 ≤ p < 0.100; ** 0.010 ≤ p < 0.050; *** 0.0001 ≤ p <0.010
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APPENDIX 3
Basic statistics of dependent and independent variables for the smaller GMM sample
Panel A: total sample
VC + non VC VC non VC
Median Mean St.Dev. Minimum Maximum Median Mean St. Dev. Median Mean St.Dev. Sign.
(Ii,t / Ki,t-1)tang 0.263 0.488 0.735   0.002   8.049 0.251 0.496 0.807 0.279 0.482 0.673
(Ii,t-1 / Ki,t-2) tang 0.276 0.566 0.973   0.003 11.314 0.270 0.568 0.943 0.278 0.566 0.996
(Ii,t-1 / Ki,t-2) intang (1) 0.000 0.030 0.127   0.000   1.378 0.000 0.046 0.157 0.000 0.017 0.094 ****
∆ log VAi,t 0.058 0.064 0.238 -1.129   1.292 0.071 0.084 0.240 0.046 0.049 0.236 ***
∆ log VAi,t-1 0.074 0.091 0.250 -1.102   1.320 0.099 0.119 0.268 0.059 0.069 0.232 ****
CFit / Ki,t-1 0.435 0.658 0.708  0.013   5.842 0.397 0.590 0.616 0.476 0.712 0.769 ***
CFi,t-1 / Ki,t-2 0.459 0.700 0.771  0.008   8.112 0.417 0.634 0.691 0.499 0.753 0.825 ***
# observations 1756 777 979
# firms   402 179 223
Panel B: mature companies
VC + non VC VC non VC
Median Mean St.Dev. Minimum Maximum Median Mean St. Dev. Median Mean St.Dev. Sign.
(Ii,t / Ki,t-1)tang 0.271 0.476 0.677  0.003   6.131 0.252 0.489 0.748 0.288 0.465 0.614
(Ii,t-1 / Ki,t-2) tang 0.276 0.526 0.833  0.003 11.314 0.263 0.525 0.764 0.286 0.527 0.885
(Ii,t-1 / Ki,t-2) intang (2) 0.000 0.023 0.103  0.000   1.333 0.000 0.037 0.0132 0.000 0.011 0.070 ***
∆ log VAi,t 0.053 0.057 0.222 -1.119   1.274 0.069 0.074 0.214 0.041 0.043 0.228 ***
∆ log VAi,t-1 0.068 0.078 0.225 -1.102   1.274 0.087 0.098 0.226 0.056 0.062 0.222 ***
CFit / Ki,t-1 0.437 0.665 0.721  0.013   5.841 0.407 0.597 0.602 0.467 0.720 0.799 **
CFi,t-1 / Ki,t-2 0.454 0.698 0.769  0.008   8.112 0.420 0.630 0.637 0.495 0.752 0.856 ***
# observations 1252 555 697
# firms 275 122 153
Significance level of Wilcoxon rank sum test (two tailed): ** 0.010 ≤ p < 0.050; *** 0.0001 ≤ p <0.010; **** p <0.0001
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APPENDIX 4
Basic statistics of investments in tangible assets (Ii,t / Ki,t-1)tang by year after VC participation for the smaller GMM sample
Panel A: total sample
VC + non VC VC non VC Sign.Year after VC
participation # observations Median Mean St. Dev. Minimum Maximum Median Mean St. Dev. Median Mean St.Dev.
0 230 0.325 0.660 1.004 0.004 8.049 0.372 0.822 1.257 0.310 0.539 0.747 *
1 296 0.298 0.489 0.657 0.008 5.649 0.285 0.538 0.854 0.302 0.451 0.449
2 336 0.260 0.477 0.709 0.002 5.225 0.235 0.382 0.433 0.274 0.554 0.862
3 352 0.243 0.497 0.726 0.003 6.131 0.222 0.449 0.697 0.268 0.535 0.748
4 305 0.238 0.432 0.657 0.003 5.055 0.207 0.400 0.664 0.278 0.458 0.653
5 237 0.209 0.395 0.638 0.003 4.472 0.202 0.498 0.876 0.212 0.310 0.314
Panel B: large companies
VC + non VC VC non VC Sign.Year after VC
participation # observations Median Mean St. Dev. Minimum Maximum Median Mean St. Dev. Median Mean St.Dev.
0 197 0.323 0.609 0.832 0.004 5.131 0.341 0.713 0.915 0.303 0.531 0.759
1 241 0.295 0.472 0.609 0.008 4.982 0.263 0.521 0.789 0.299 0.434 0.421
2 241 0.269 0.458 0.645 0.008 5.225 0.258 0.374 0.426 0.287 0.527 0.776
3 234 0.246 0.474 0.689 0.003 6.131 0.235 0.434 0.699 0.257 0.506 0.682
4 194 0.236 0.430 0.634 0.003 4.911 0.205 0.450 0.795 0.286 0.413 0.468
5 145 0.252 0.399 0.617 0.006 4.473 0.252 0.481 0.832 0.254 0.326 0.339
Significance level of Wilcoxon rank sum test (two tailed): * 0.050 ≤ p < 0.100;
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APPENDIX 5
Results of panel data analyses for the smaller GMM sample
Panel A: total sample
Total Sample VC backed Non VC backed Total Sample VC backed Non VC backed
Intercept -0.044 -1.984 **** -0.114 -2.083 **** -1.967 **** -0.169
(Ii,t-1 / Ki,t-2) tang -0.088 ****   -0.114 *** -0.067 *** -0.092 **** -0.120 *** -0.071 ***
(Ii,t-1 / Ki,t-2) intang 0.193 0.207 0.119
∆ log VAi,t 0.196 ** 0.404 **** 0.020 0.194 ** 0.412 *** 0.015
∆ log VAi,t-1 -0.134 *   -0.240 * -0.045 -0.138 * -0.235 * -0.057
Sum of value added coefficients 0.062   0.164 -0.025 0.056 0.177 -0.042
CFit / Ki,t-1 0.565 **** 0.811 **** 0.601 **** 0.562 **** 0.803 **** 0.598 ****
CFi,,t-1 / Ki,t-2 0.177 ***   0.201 **     0.138 ** 0.179 *** 0.202 ** 0.140 ***
Sum of CF coefficients 0.742 ****   1.012 ****     0.739 **** 0.741 **** 1.005 **** 0.738 ****
VC * [CFit / Ki,t-1] 0.321 0.317 ***
VC * [CFi,,t-1 / Ki,t-2] -0.037 -0.038
Sum of VC * CF coefficients 0.284 *** 0.279 ***
# observations 1756  777 979 1736 768 968
# firms 402     179 223   400 179 221
Panel B: mature companies
Total Sample VC backed Non VC backed Total Sample VC backed Non VC backed
Intercept -0.078 0.152 -0.136 0.074 0.169 -0.142
(Ii,t-1 / Ki,t-2) tang -0.084 *** -0.125 ** -0.061 * -0.097 *** -0.152 *** -0.065 **
(Ii,t-1 / Ki,t-2) intang 0.340 0.516 -0.059
∆ log VAi,t 0.103 0.014 0.170 0.098 0.015 0.161
∆ log VAi,t-1 -0.111 -0.263 * -0.004 -0.131 -0.295 * -0.025
Sum of value added coefficients -0.008 -0.249 0.166 -0.033 -0.280 0.136
CFit / Ki,t-1 0.447 **** 0.843 **** 0.449 **** 0.441 **** 0.837 **** 0.443 ****
CFi,,t-1 / Ki,t-2 0.164 *** 0.232 **     0.139 ** 0.170 ** 0.230 * 0.145 ***
Sum of CF coefficients 0.611 **** 1.075 ****     0.588 **** 0.611 **** 1.067 **** 0.588 ****
VC * [CFit / Ki,t-1] 0.424 **** 0.429 ****
VC * [CFi,,t-1 / Ki,t-2] 0.025 0.011
Sum of VC * CF coefficients 0.449 *** 0.440 ***
# observations 1252 555 697 1238 549 689
# firms 275 122 153 274 122 152
Significance level of Wilcoxon rank sum test (two tailed):  ** 0.010 ≤ p < 0.050; *** 0.0001 ≤ p <0.010; **** p < 0.0001
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TABLE 1
Description of the sample
Panel A: Panel data analyses
Total sample Mature companies Young companies
Number of observations (companies) VC + non VC VC non VC VC + non VC VC non VC VC + non VC VC non VC
Sample at start: 4991 (1130) 2440 (565) 2551 (565) 2348 (512) 1129 (256) 1219 (256) 2643 (618) 1311 (309) 1332 (309)
Remove observations with (1):
- Negative cash flows 1931 (732) 1070 (389) 861 (343) 587 (217) 343 (119) 244 (98) 1344 (515) 727 (270) 617 (245)
- Negative investments 1599 (636) 790 (319) 809 (317) 408 (157) 211 (77) 197 (80) 1191 (479) 579 (242) 612 (237)
- Missing values 1264 (518) 721 (275) 543 (243) 215 (69) 139 (41) 76 (28) 1049 (449) 582 (234) 467 (215)
- Outliers (2) 169 (37) 75 (22) 94 (15) 81 (12) 30 (8) 51 (4) 88 (25) 45 (14) 43 (11)
- Insufficient observations per firm 101 (101) 46 (46) 55 (55) 47 (47) 21 (21) 26 (26) 54 (54) 25 (25) 29 (29)
Final sample 2346 (598) 1072 (278) 1274 (320) 1441 (337) 657 (154) 784 (183) 905 (261) 415 (124) 490 (137)
- % of sample at start 0.52 0.53 0.43 0.49 0.50 0.57 0.61 0.66 0.58 0.60 0.64 0.71 0.34 0.42 0.32 0.40 0.37 0.44
Panel B: GMM analyses
Total sample Mature companies
Number of observations (companies) VC + non VC VC non VC VC + non VC VC non VC
Sample at start: 4991 (1130) 2440 (565) 2551 (565) 2348 (512) 1129 (256) 1219 (256)
Remove observations with (1):
- Negative cash flows 1931 (732) 1070 (389) 861 (343) 587 (217) 343 (119) 244 (98)
- Negative investments 1599 (636) 790 (319) 809 (317) 408 (157) 211 (77) 197 (80)
- Missing values 1751 (668) 960 (345) 791 (323) 323 (145) 196 (77) 127 (68)
- Outliers(2) 183 (49) 84 (24) 99 (25) 101 (17) 46 (10) 55 (7)
- Insufficient observations per firm(3) 366 (239) 183 (119) 183 (120) 145 (98) 73 (47) 72 (51)
Final sample 1756 (402) 777 (179) 979 (223) 1248 (247) 555 (122) 693 (152)
- % of sample at start 0.39 0.35 0.32 0.32 0.38 0.39 0.53 0.48 0.49 0.48 0.57 0.60
 (1) Observations with missing values for one or more variables in the analyses, observations with negative (lagged) cash flow, with negative (lagged) investment, and firms for which
only one observation is available are excluded from the sample. Moreover, outliers are filtered.
(2) The outliers are filtered using a 0.5 % top/bottom percentile filter .
(3) The minimum required number of observations per firm is two to conduct panel data analyses and three to conduct GMM analyses.
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TABLE 2
Descriptives of dependent and independent variables
Panel A: total sample
VC + non VC VC non VC
Median Mean St.Dev. Minimum Maximum Median Mean St. Dev. Median Mean St.Dev. Sign.
(Ii,t)tang  (‘000 €)   151    947   6762   0.074 215682   243   892   2636   107   993   8853 ****
(Ii,t)intang  (‘000 €)       0    121   1314   0.000   36925       0   110     625       0   130   1688 ****
VAi,t (‘000 €) 1288 4157 17211 11.825 599766 1625 4035 75974   995 4260 22296 ****
CFit  (‘000 €)   238 1273   9353   0.099 350158   335 1237   3320   186 1302 12323 ****
Kit  (‘000 €)   662 3329 19787   1.239 554684 1029 3648 11649   429 3061 24635 ****
(Ii,t / Ki,t-1)tang 0.259 0.514 0.825  0.002 10.220 0.252 0.533 0.893 0.270 0.498 0.763
(Ii,t-1 / Ki,t-2) tang 0.276 0.647 1.359  0.003 18.686 0.278 0.651 1.309 0.275 0.643 1.400
(Ii,t-1 / Ki,t-2) intang (1) 0.000 0.034 0.147  0.000   1.949 0.000 0.051 0.179 0.000 0.020 0.112 ****
∆ log VAi,t 0.065 0.079 0.265 -1.129   1.292 0.088 0.106 0.265 0.046 0.057 0.263 ****
∆ log VAi,t-1 0.090 0.136 0.343 -1.102   2.568 0.114 0.174 0.368 0.069 0.104 0.316 ****
CFit / Ki,t-1 0.432 0.700 0.920  0.013 15.289 0.397 0.615 0.725 0.472 0.773 1.051 ****
CFi,t-1 / Ki,t-2 0.454 0.783 1.185  0.011 20.529 0.411 0.680 0.910 0.498 0.870 1.368 ****
# observations 2346 1072 1274
# firms 598 278 320
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Panel B: mature companies
VC + non VC VC non VC
Median Mean St.Dev. Minimum Maximum Median Mean St. Dev. Median Mean St.Dev. Sign.
(Ii,t)tang  (‘000 €)   189   787 3160   0.074   91951   285   796 1676   122   789   4001 ****
(Ii,t)intang  (‘000 €)       0     69   602   0.000   12925       0     77   420       0     62     721 ****
VAi,t (‘000 €) 1590 4068 8443 11.825   91003 1933 4293 7699 1350 3925   9021 ****
CFit  (‘000 €)   287 1005 2607   0.099   45948   384 1186 2945   224   853   2277 ****
Kit  (‘000 €)   781 2551 7800   1.239 154965 1135 2916 6376   498 2244   8811 ****
(Ii,t / Ki,t-1)tang 0.270 0.493 0.743  0.003 10.220 0.260 0.527 0.800 0.280 0.466 0.690
(Ii,t-1 / Ki,t-2) tang 0.276 0.566 1.136  0.003 18.686 0.278 0.573 1.009 0.276 0.560 1.233
(Ii,t-1 / Ki,t-2) intang (2) 0.000 0.027 0.134  0.000   1.949 0.000 0.045 0.167 0.000 0.013 0.096 ***
∆ log VAi,t 0.053 0.058 0.230 -1.119   2.276 0.071 0.081 0.229 0.038 0.039 0.230 ***
∆ log VAi,t-1 0.070 0.086 0.254 -1.102   2.276 0.095 0.116 0.268 0.054 0.062 0.239 ****
CFit / Ki,t-1 0.440 0.692 0.830  0.013 12.624 0.417 0.628 0.677 0.477 0.745 0.937 **
CFi,t-1 / Ki,t-2 0.462 0.756 1.005  0.013 16.564 0.423 0.695 0.866 0.497 0.806 1.106 **
# observations 1441 657 784
# firms 337 154 183
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Panel C: young companies
VC + non VC VC non VC
Median Mean St.Dev. Minimum Maximum Median Mean St. Dev. Median Mean St.Dev. Sign.
(Ii,t)tang  (‘000 €)   119 1201 10128   0.248 215682   173 1042   3673   86 1336 13349 ****
(Ii,t)intang  (‘000 €)       0   204   1972   0.000   36925     0   162     853     0   239   2563 ****
VAi,t (‘000 €)   896 4299 25590 13.188 599766 1277 3712   7432 552 4796 34107 ****
CFit  (‘000 €)   180 1700 14689   0.447 350157   251 1319   3842 122 2022 19651 ****
Kit  (‘000 €)   487 4569 30269   1.413 554684   752 4806 16866 307 4367 38116 ****
(Ii,t / Ki,t-1)tang 0.239 0.547 0.941 0.002   9.391 0.228 0.543 1.023 0.246 0.550 0.867
(Ii,t-1 / Ki,t-2) tang 0.276 0.775 1.645 0.003 17.497 0.279 0.774 1.672 0.271 0.775 1.624
(Ii,t-1 / Ki,t-2) intang (3) 0.000 0.044 0.166 0.000   1.705 0.000 0.060 0.196 0.000 0.030 0.133 ****
∆ log VAi,t 0.097 0.113 0.309 -1.129   1.292 0.122 0.145 0.310 0.066 0.085 0.306 ***
∆ log VAi,t-1 0.146 0.216 0.438 -1.002   2.568 0.179 0.267 0.472 0.118 0.171 0.402 ***
CFit / Ki,t-1 0.408 0.714 1.046 0.015 15.289 0.369 0.593 0.795 0.461 0.817 1.211 ***
CFi,t-1 / Ki,t-2 0.444 0.827 1.424 0.011 20.529 0.374 0.657 0.977 0.502 0.971 1.701 ****
# observations 905 415 490
# firms 261 124 137
Significance level of Wilcoxon rank sum test (two tailed): ** 0.010 ≤ p < 0.050; *** 0.0001 ≤ p <0.010;**** p < 0.0001
(1)  Statistics based on 2327 observations or 592 firms; (2)  Statistics based on 1440 observations or 338 firms; (3)  Statistics based on 887 observations or 254 firms;
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TABLE 3
Results of panel data analyses
Panel A: total sample
Total Sample VC backed Non VC backed Total Sample VC backed Non VC backed
Intercept -0.229 -0.096 -0.042 -0.202 -0.065 -0.060
(Ii,t-1 / Ki,t-2) tang -0.084 **** -0.164 **** -0.027 -0.092 **** -0.180 **** -0.026
(Ii,t-1 / Ki,t-2) intang -0.084 -0.134 0.117
∆ log VAi,t 0.263 *** 0.395 *** 0.109 0.335 **** 0.488 **** 0.132
∆ log VAi,t-1 0.082 0.099 * 0.039 0.131 ** 0.146 0.075
Sum of value added coefficients 0.345 *** 0.494 *** 0.148 0.466 **** 0.634 **** 0.207
CFit / Ki,t-1 0.274 **** 0.551 **** 0.312 **** 0.249 **** 0.411 **** 0.304 ****
CFi,,t-1 / Ki,t-2 0.046 * 0.242 **** 0.012 0.039 0.288 **** -0.006 **
Sum of CF coefficients 0.320 **** 0.793 **** 0.324 **** 0.288 **** 0.699 **** 0.298 ****
VC * [CFit / Ki,t-1] 0.347 **** 0.222 *
VC * [CFi,,t-1 / Ki,t-2] 0.128 *** 0.176 **
Sum of VC * CF coefficients 0.475 **** 0.398 ****
# observations 2346 1072 1274 2327 1060 1267
# firms 598 278 320 592 275 317
Panel B: mature companies
Total Sample VC backed Non VC backed Total Sample VC backed Non VC backed
Intercept -0.075 0.338 -0.177 0.189 0.403 -0.174
(Ii,t-1 / Ki,t-2) tang -0.059 *** -0.130 *** -0.026 -0.064 *** -0.159 **** -0.015
(Ii,t-1 / Ki,t-2) intang 0.047 0.080 0.053
∆ log VAi,t 0.189 *** 0.127 0.224 * 0.260 *** 0.261 * 0.207
∆ log VAi,t-1 0.047 0.182 -0.077 0.108 0.231 0.005
Sum of value added coefficients 0.236 0.309 0.147 0.368 ** 0.492 ** 0.212
CFit / Ki,t-1 0.346 **** 0.508 **** 0.353 **** 0.318 **** 0.352 **** 0.349 ****
CFi,,t-1 / Ki,t-2 0.070 0.245 **** 0.063 0.002 0.280 **** -0.017
Sum of CF coefficients 0.416 **** 0.753 **** 0.416 **** 0.320 **** 0.632 **** 0.332 ****
VC * [CFit / Ki,t-1] 0.202 ** 0.073 *
VC * [CFi,,t-1 / Ki,t-2] 0.151 ** 0.244 ****
Sum of VC * CF coefficients 0.353 *** 0.317 ***
# observations 1441 657 784 1440 650 790
# firms 337 154 183 338 153 185
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Panel C: young companies
Total Sample VC backed Non VC backed Total Sample VC backed Non VC backed
Intercept -0.240 -0.174 -0.068 -0.209 -0.151 -0.088
(Ii,t-1 / Ki,t-2) tang -0.105 **** -0.190 **** -0.028 -0.120 **** -0.197 **** -0.035
(Ii,t-1 / Ki,t-2) intang -0.193 -0.374 0.141
∆ log VAi,t 0.291 ** 0.578 *** -0.005 0.358 ** 0.612 *** 0.038
∆ log VAi,t-1 0.078 -0.055 0.126 0.117 -0.017 0.149
Sum of value added coefficients 0.369 ** 0.523 ** 0.121 0.475 *** 0.595 ** 0.187
CFit / Ki,t-1 0.230 **** 0.635 **** 0.277 **** 0.216 **** 0.503 **** 0.273 ****
CFi,,t-1 / Ki,t-2 0.039 0.226 *** -0.010 0.080 0.274 *** 0.001
Sum of CF coefficients 0.269 **** 0.861 **** 0.267 **** 0.296 **** 0.777 **** 0.274 ****
VC * [CFit / Ki,t-1] 0.520 **** 0.399 ****
VC * [CFi,,t-1 / Ki,t-2] 0.084 0.099
Sum of VC * CF coefficients 0.604 **** 0.498 ****
# observations 905 415 490
# firms 261 124 137 254 122 132
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TABLE 4
Results of GMM analyses
Panel A: total sample
Total Sample VC backed Non VC backed Total Sample VC backed Non VC backed
Intercept 0.144 * 0.229 ** 0.111 0.154 ** 0.268 *** 0.105
(Ii,t-1 / Ki,t-2) tang -0.029 0.003 -0.099 -0.030 0.021 -0.116
(Ii,t-1 / Ki,t-2) intang -0.055   -0.131 0.420
∆ log VAi,t -0.159 0.074 -0.311 ** -0.156 0.075 -0.303 **
∆ log VAi,t-1 -0.066 0.064 -0.122 -0.047 0.090 -0.131
Sum of value added coefficients -0.225 0.138 -0.433 * -0.203 0.165 -0.475 *
CFit / Ki,t-1 0.894 **** 1.370 **** 0.844 **** 0.888 **** 1.319 **** 0.840 ****
CFi,,t-1 / Ki,t-2 0.154 * 0.011 0.233 ** 0.170 0.019 0.261 **
Sum of CF coefficients 1.138 **** 1.381 **** 1.077 **** 1.058 **** 1.338 *** 1.101 ***
VC * [CFit / Ki,t-1] 0.360 * 0.304
VC * [CFi,,t-1 / Ki,t-2] -0.103 -0.088
Sum of VC * CF coefficients 0.257 0.216
m(1) (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.036 0.000 0.001 0.055
m(2) (p-value) 0.555 0.760 0.566 0.635 0.756 0.699
Sargan test (p-value) 0.464 0.317 0.871 0.441 0.332 0.851
# observations 1756 777 979 1736 768 968
# firms 402 179 223   400 179 221
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Panel B: mature companies
Total Sample VC backed Non VC backed Total Sample
Intercept 0.135 0.229 ** 0.112 0.148 ***
(Ii,t-1 / Ki,t-2) tang -0.021 0.003 -0.099 -0.005
(Ii,t-1 / Ki,t-2) intang -0.115
VAit / Ki,t-1 -0.256 ** 0.074 -0.311 ** -0.255 **
VAi,t-1 / Ki,t-2 -0.174 * 0.064 -0.122 -0.136
Sum of value added coefficients -0.430 ** 0.138 -0.433 * -0.391 **
CFit / Ki,t-1 0.644 **** 1.370 **** 0.844 **** 0.626 ****
CFi,,t-1 / Ki,t-2 0.271 *** 0.011 0.232 ** 0.253 **
Sum of CF coefficients 0.915 *** 1.381 **** 1.076 **** 0.879 ***
VC * [CFit / Ki,t-1] 0.580 *** 0.555 ***
VC * [CFi,,t-1 / Ki,t-2] -0.167 -0.151
Sum of VC * CF coefficients 0.413 * 0.404 *
m(1) (p-value) 0.000 0.001 0.037 0.000
m(2) (p-value) 0.695 0.760 0.547 0.672
Sargan test (p-value) 0.426 0.317 0.871 0.326
# observations 1252 777 979 1238
# firms 275 179 223 274
